

# **Police and Public Safety in New York City**

A report by the  
Citizens Crime Commission of New York City

January 2004

## **INTRODUCTION**

In July 2001, the Citizens Crime Commission of New York City released a report on crime, police and the community. Two months later, the environment governing police and public safety was fundamentally changed by the attack on the World Trade Center

As is our regular practice, the Crime Commission has continued to study police operations, crime and safety in New York City. We are issuing this report to summarize our latest findings. As we did with our previous study, we retained the Fordham Institute to supplement our work by conducting a survey of citizen attitudes towards police and community safety.

Part One of this report presents the Crime Commission's observations. Part Two contains the findings of the Fordham Institute's survey.

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**PART ONE**

**FROM COMPSTAT TO STRATEGIC TARGETING:  
THE NEW OPERATIONS OF THE NYPD**

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## I: An Anxious City, New York at the End of 2001

Over the years the two key problems facing the NYPD have been crime and community relations. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, a third C, counter-terrorism, has become equally important.

At the time of the attack, many New Yorkers were already concerned about safety. Since 1990, New York City had experienced unprecedented reductions in crime. (See Table 1.)

**Table 1**  
New York City: Number of Index Crimes, 1990 v. 2001

Index Crimes	1990	2001	% Decrease <sup>1</sup> (Rounded to nearest whole number)
<b>Murder &amp; Non-negligent Manslaughter</b>	2,245	642	71
<b>Forcible Rape</b>	3,126	1,530	51
<b>Robbery</b>	100,280	28,202	72
<b>Aggravated Assault</b>	68,891	37,893	45
<b>Burglary</b>	119,937	31,563	74
<b>Larceny-Theft</b>	268,620	133,938	50
<b>Motor Vehicle Theft</b>	147,123	29,989	80
<b>Total Index Crimes</b>	710,222	266,587	62

Source: FBI, Uniform Crime Report, 1990, Table 6. Uniform Crime Report, 2001, Table 8.

<sup>1</sup> Measured in rate per 100,000 population, the decreases were actually greater because the population of the city rose from approximately 7.3 million in 1990 to over 8 million in 2001. For example, during that period the murder rate fell from 30.7 per 100,000 to 8.1, a decrease of 73%, and the rate of overall index crime fell by 66%.

In addition, far fewer drug dealers, disorderly persons and aggressive hustlers populated the streets. Writers labeled the crime decreases and the sea change in public order the “New York Miracle.” However, in 2002 a new city administration was scheduled to take office, prompting many people to question whether increased crime, disorder and a general lessening of public safety would follow.

In fact, in 2002 the number of index crimes reported was 5% lower than in 2001. Murders fell below 600 for the first time since 1963. In Manhattan the number recorded was lower than it had been at any time in the previous 100 years. In 2003, overall crime was again down 5% from the previous year. The 2003 Community Survey indicates, the vast majority of New Yorkers continue to feel safe and to give high marks to the police.

Why has crime continued to decrease in New York City? Two theories have been advanced: (1) crime trends in New York simply reflect the national experience, e.g. “crime is down everywhere”; (2) the crime fighting system created prior to 2002 has been kept in place and as long as it continues to function crime will fall.

The twin notions that by some natural process crime is fading away across the nation or, conversely, that in New York a foolproof system for controlling crime has been perfected are akin to the common belief of a few years ago that stock prices could only rise or that successful investing was assured if one adhered to the correct formula. Most cities have not experienced anything near the same percentage decreases in crime as New York City has in the last few years, and some that did register significant (though lesser) reductions have begun to see increases.

During the 1990s the NYPD developed many effective anti-crime programs. But as with all successful programs over time, as conditions change and problems develop, they require

adjustment or replacement or both. In addition, since 9/11 the need to protect against terrorist threats has placed additional demands on the Department at the same time that shortfalls in municipal revenue have caused a significant decrease in police strength. As a result, the NYPD has revised old strategies and tactics and developed new crime fighting programs.

In the sections that follow, this report will track New York City crime trends and describe how, when faced with new challenges, the NYPD has overcome them. The report will then examine whether New York City can continue its successful crime-fighting and counter-terrorism programs in the coming years.

## II: Are the New York Crime Decreases Simply Part of a Sustained National Trend?

Table 2 compares New York's crime experience in its "miracle" years to those of other large American cities.

**Table 2**  
Index Crime Rate Per 100,000 Population for U.S. Cities 1990-2001

	1990	2001	% Decrease
<b>All Cities Over 250,000 (except New York City)</b>	10,268	6,924	33
<b>New York City</b>	9,699	3,323	66

Source: FBI, Uniform Crime Report, 1990, Table 14 & Table 6. Uniform Crime Report, 2001, Table 16 and Table 8.

As the table illustrates, New York City's reductions were much greater than the average for other large cities.

Murder is a very well reported crime and a key indicator of trends in violence.<sup>2</sup> One indicator of murder trends is the change in New York's relative position. Los Angeles and Chicago, though much smaller in population than New York, both reported more total murders in 2002. (See Table 3.)

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<sup>2</sup> The FBI has observed: "The typical assumptions associated with homicides throughout this century must be reevaluated in view of the unprecedented shift in national homicide patterns as evidenced during the 1990s. Every American now has a realistic chance of murder victimization in view of the random nature the crime has assumed. This notion is somewhat supported by the fact that a majority of the Nation's murder victims are now killed by strangers or unknown persons. The advent of this trend has generated a profound fear of murder victimization...". (Source: FBI, Uniform Crime Report, 1993, pp. 286-287.)



**Table 3**  
**Three Largest U.S. Cities**  
**Number of Murders and Rate Per 100,000 (in parentheses)**

	<b>1990</b>	<b>2002</b>
<b>New York City</b>	2,245 (30.7)	587 ( 7.3)
<b>Los Angeles</b>	983 (28.2)	654 (17.1)
<b>Chicago</b>	851 (30.6)	648 (22.1)

Note: In 1990, the population (rounded to the nearest 1,000) of New York was 7,323,000; Los Angeles, 3,485,000; and Chicago, 2,784,000. In 2002, their respective populations were 8,085,000; 3,831,000; and, 2,938,000. See FBI, Uniform Crime Report, 1990, Table 6, and Uniform Crime Report, 2002, Table 8.

As the table indicates, in 1990 the murder rates in the three cities were roughly comparable. In 2002, New York City's murder rate was less than half that of Los Angeles and approximately a third of Chicago's.

New York's unmatched and sustained reductions in crime cannot be explained by the notion that "the same thing happened everywhere," because it did not. As many analysts have pointed out, the primary explanation for New York's falling crime rates lies in innovative programs developed by the NYPD.

### **III: Why Was the NYPD So Successful at Reducing Crime?**

In 1990 New York City adopted the Safe Streets Act, which provided for the hiring of over 6,000 additional police officers to be paid for out of special dedicated taxes, and introduced new, proactive anti-crime strategies in place of the reactive “911” system. Between 1990–1995 the combined strength of the NYPD and the other two city-funded forces (Transit and Housing) was increased from approximately 31,000 to 38,000 officers. These additional numbers permitted the NYPD to develop many new anti-crime programs and introduce innovative management techniques. For example, in 1994 the Department began to utilize a system known as COMPSTAT (computer generated comparative statistics). COMPSTAT furnished crime data on a weekly basis, whereas in the past the figures had often lagged months behind. The constantly updated information provided the basis for “COMPSTAT” meetings in which groups of superior officers from individual boroughs were periodically brought to police headquarters to review the crime figures for their commands. The meetings identified crime trends and the appropriate tactics for dealing with them. When necessary, taking advantage of the increased complement of officers, headquarters would provide additional personnel requested by field commanders, who were then expected to achieve significant crime reductions. The essence of COMPSTAT was that it put crime at the forefront of the NYPD and held commanders accountable for dealing with it.

Translating the COMPSTAT philosophy into actual crime reductions required the development of a number of operational strategies. One that was described as the “lynchpin” emphasized enforcing laws against street disorder as a means of improving the quality of life.<sup>3</sup>

Coupled with the order maintenance efforts was a vigorous campaign against drug dealers. A third strategy involved stepped up activity against gun crime. Special police squads were sent into high gun crime areas to concentrate on making arrests.

The three programs aimed, respectively, at disorder, drugs and guns had a synergistic effect. In making an arrest for drug dealing or disorderly conduct officers would sometimes find guns. Apprehending gunmen might disrupt a narcotic gang. Soon drug dealers, the disorderly and gunmen began to abandon the streets. Many drug dealers were imprisoned and those who remained free found their business severely curtailed. Before the imposition of the anti-crime programs, most drug buys took place on the streets and were accomplished with relative ease. After the police enforcement drives began, many dealers retreated indoors and put into effect stringent procedures to screen potential buyers. As the dealers retreated, police kept up the pressure by raiding apartments where sales were carried out.

Another notable strategy was the emphasis on apprehending fugitives. At the beginning of the 1990s, Department files contained some 300,000 outstanding warrants. Until that time the police had lacked the resources to execute them. At that point the warrant units were beefed up and vigorous efforts were made to apprehend wanted fugitives. The rationale was that many of these offenders were continuing to commit crimes and, therefore, their apprehension would significantly reduce the crime rate.

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<sup>3</sup> The basis of this strategy was a popular social science theory, “Broken Windows,” which posited that just as leaving a broken window unrepaired signals no one cares, thereby causing more windows to be broken by vandals, failure to deal with street disorder will cause law-abiding citizens to forsake the streets and encourage more predatory ones to move in and take control.

As crime fell to rates not seen for a generation, the NYPD stepped up its efforts. Between 1997 and 2000, the strength of the force was raised from 38,000 to nearly 41,000. Moreover, one hundred million dollars of overtime money was made available annually for programs such as Operation Condor, under which a thousand extra officers were assigned daily to continue the pressure on drug dealers.

#### **IV: Post 9-11, Fighting Terrorism and Crime at the Same Time**

The post-2001 NYPD crime fighting system is not an exact replica of the one that preceded it. Changes have occurred due to the threat of terrorism, financial constraints and new, strategic thinking. On September 11, 2001, 17 officers were assigned full-time to counter-terrorism duties. Today, with New York the only American city on constant Orange Alert (the second highest status), over 1,000 officers are on counter-terrorism assignment. During the Iraq war, when New York City went to Red Alert, the number was considerably higher. At the same time that the NYPD faced increased staffing needs there was a downturn in the economy, exacerbated by the effects of 9/11, which significantly reduced municipal revenues. As a result, police strength dropped from a high of nearly 41,000 in 2000 to below 36,000 at some periods in early 2003. Thus, the NYPD no longer had sufficient personnel to undertake area saturation programs like Operation Condor. Instead, it has deployed its forces in a more precise and flexible manner. To facilitate this, it has developed an enhanced intelligence gathering system, rapid mobilization tactics and many new crime fighting programs.

##### Enhanced Intelligence Gathering

New York City offers many targets for terrorists. In addition to the 1993 and 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, law enforcement has uncovered plots directed against the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels, the George Washington and Brooklyn Bridges, the United Nations headquarters, the Federal Office Plaza in downtown Manhattan and the city's subways. In the current climate of threat, the NYPD has had to develop new counter-terrorism programs.

Prior to 9/11, NYPD intelligence activities were somewhat limited in scope. According to Police Commissioner Ray Kelly, the intelligence division mostly functioned as a security detail for the protection of dignitaries, itself a challenging task in a city frequently visited by the President of the United States and other world leaders, and home to the United Nations diplomatic corps. In 2002, the division was expanded in size and placed under the direction of a Deputy Commissioner who was formerly a high-ranking official of the CIA. Now the NYPD receives intelligence information from worldwide sources and it has officers stationed overseas at Scotland Yard, Interpol headquarters, the Middle East and other key locations. The Department also maintains a full partnership in the police–FBI joint terrorist task force. In addition, in 2002 the Police Commissioner appointed as Deputy Commissioner for Counter-Terrorism a marine general whose mission was to improve the Department’s ability to prevent and to respond to terrorist threats.

#### Rapid Mobilization—Constant Field Training

In the past, the NYPD often did not perform well when it had to mobilize a large number of officers quickly. During the blackout of 1977, the police response was so slow that widespread looting occurred. This was partly due to the fact that interboro traffic must move through bridges and tunnels and also because the Department did not have the resources to train and deploy a large number of mobile units.

In order to combat terrorism, the Department has secured such potential targets as bridges, tunnels and landmarks. It has also established checkpoints at routes in and out of Manhattan. One example of the new police activities is Operation Atlas, which commenced at the time of the Iraq War. In it a number of Hercules teams—heavily armed, well-trained

units—patrol the city in unmarked black vans and frequently appear in strength at various high-risk locations. While their operations appear random, they are carried out in a systematic fashion, albeit one that is difficult for hostile observers to anticipate. The Department has also established special teams to combat chemical and biological warfare. In Operation Sampson, the NYPD conducts frequent drills whereby officers are mobilized to move quickly to threatened areas. In testimony before the U. S. Congress the Police Commissioner reported that an Al Qaeda operative surveying the Brooklyn Bridge reported back to his handlers that “the weather was too hot,” e.g., a contemplated attack should not be launched because security was too tight. During the blackout of August 14, 2003, the police were able to quickly mobilize large numbers of officers, move them to potential trouble spots and secure these areas so that there was no significant looting or disorder.

#### Intelligence Applied to Traditional Crime Fighting

Each precinct now has a sergeant and each borough a squad devoted exclusively to intelligence work so that use of intelligence methods permeate the entire Department at all levels. In the past, under COMPSTAT, the NYPD was able to identify crime trends. Then, it sought to develop appropriate responses, after which intelligence was collected to facilitate carrying them out. While COMPSTAT could determine the patterns of crime, it could not explain why they existed. Now intelligence information is gathered to determine the reasons behind particular crime trends. This is then fed into a strategic targeting section that coordinates all intelligence. Its goal is to develop programs that impact on crime on a citywide level. For instance, felony warrants previously were given precedence over misdemeanor warrants for service. An analysis of some misdemeanor warrants, however, disclosed that

many of the subjects had long criminal records and, therefore, were presumed to be active criminals. Currently these warrants are executed ahead of those for felons with less serious records on the theory that the new priority will lead to greater reductions in crime. In addition, since modern crime knows no state or national boundaries, the strategic targeting section, working in conjunction with their federal counterparts, seeks to develop a global perspective on crime.

### New Crime Fighting Programs

As in the past, the Department continues to focus on fundamental problems such as quality-of-life, drugs, and guns, while employing new methods to do so. As a result, overall crime decreased 5% in 2002 and another 5% in 2003.

- **Quality-of-Life.** Beginning in January, 2002, the Department inaugurated Operation Clean Sweep, in which 100 high disorder areas were marked for special attention by police. To date, under Clean Sweep, there have been over 20,000 arrests and 209,000 summonses issued for quality-of-life violations. To combat noise, 24 areas were designated for inclusion in Operation Silent Night. In these areas, the police have made 7,500 arrests (1100 for felony crimes) and issued 111,000 summonses. In addition, under Operation Spotlight, quality-of-life enforcement now encompasses special attention to recidivist low-level offenders, who are processed through special parts of the criminal court. To date, over 18,000 of these offenders have been identified.

At the beginning of 2002, many people feared that the police would abandon quality-of-life enforcement. In contrast, the community survey (see Part Two) indicates that respondents seem to be witnessing an even greater amount of such enforcement.

- **High Crime Areas.** In 2002, the NYPD instituted Operation Impact, under which 24 small, high-crime pockets of the city were identified for additional patrol and enforcement by 1500 officers who have concentrated on drugs and gangs. To date 17,000 arrests have been made in these areas. In addition the generally enhanced police anti-terrorism surveillance of facilities like bridges and tunnels has also made it much more difficult for dealers to move their contraband around the city.



- **Gun Crime.** Intelligence analysts have begun mapping in detail the location of shootings and gun violations. As a result, an area composed of five precincts in Brooklyn that produce 25% of the city's shootings has been assigned additional resources, while a special gun court has been established to hear cases from the area. To date, 98% of the arrests have resulted in jail sentences with a median length of one year. At present this program is being expanded to Queens and the Bronx. Under Operation Triggerlock, in both Brooklyn and the Bronx, some gun arrests are now being processed under more stringent federal laws. The NYPD has supplemented its gun buyback program with Operation Gun Stop, which offers cash rewards of \$1,000 or more for information on gun crimes.

## **V: Can the NYPD Continue to Maintain a High Level of Public Safety?**

### Constant Change: The Norm

The history of the NYPD over the past 30 years is one of sudden change. During the fiscal crisis of 1975 3,000 officers were laid off and a hiring freeze was imposed, despite the fact that crime rates were at a then all-time high. Between 1974 and 1980 the strength of the department fell from 31,000 to 22,600 officers. During the same period, the amount of index crime rose from 520,000 to 710,000, and murders jumped from 1,554 to 1,812. At the beginning of the 1980s, the NYPD began to rebuild its strength, and by 1985 the number of officers had risen to 26,000. Concurrently, total index crimes decreased to 601,000 and the number of murders to 1,384. Then came the “crack explosion,” followed by shooting wars among drug gangs for control of the trade. In many neighborhoods residents could hear gunshots all night long, and even in daylight people feared to use the streets. By 1990, the number of murders had risen to 2,245; almost the entire increase could be attributed to drug killings. The “crack explosion” illustrated the workings of the “tipping” theory of social change in which a particular phenomenon, in this instance, murder, suddenly reaches a point where it becomes an epidemic.<sup>4</sup> Not until innovative programs were instituted in the wake of the Safe Streets Act was the NYPD able to turn the tide on crime.

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<sup>4</sup> See, Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (New York: Little Brown & Company, 2000).

### Financial Support

In the late 1990s, some observers began to call for a reduction in police strength to take advantage of the “peace dividend,” arguing that because of decreased crime fewer officers were needed. Ironically, police strength was reduced because of financial shortfalls, just as New York City, along with the rest of the country, entered a war against terrorism.

At present, no one believes that the terrorist threat will abate any time soon. Indeed, most experts feel it isn’t a question of “if” there will be a new attack but “when.” The NYPD is currently spending \$200 million a year on operational expenses related to counter-terrorism and has stated that it requires an additional \$261 million for training needs, equipment and supplies.<sup>5</sup>

In fiscal year 2003, the federal government authorized a total of \$3.45 billion for first responders (police officers, firefighters, health care workers and other emergency professionals). These funds are distributed through two programs. The first allocates 20% to selected urban areas based on an assessment of the threat of a terrorist attack. The second allots the remaining 80% to state block grants, with those funds distributed under a formula where each state gets the same flat amount and the remainder is distributed based on population. New York is generally ranked number one as a high threat area, but its rank for block grant allotment of money per capita is 49. Thus far the NYPD has received only \$72 million of this additional federal aid.

A recent report issued by a task force of the Council on Foreign Relations found that the United States is still not prepared to provide adequate emergency response to acts of terrorism. The report estimated that while the U.S. government would spend up to \$27 billion over the

next five years to train and equip first responders, approximately \$98 billion more would be needed. The Council report commented that, “Congress should establish a system for allocating scarce resources based less on dividing the spoils and more on addressing identified threats and vulnerabilities.”<sup>6</sup> A more realistic funding program would be based on such factors as known threats, the presence of vulnerable critical infrastructure, and the consequences of an attack. Under this formula New York would receive an allotment of funds adequate to its needs.

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<sup>5</sup> This figure is broken down as: \$40 million for training; \$90 million for enhanced facility security; \$82 million for equipment; and, \$49 million for communications and information technology.

<sup>6</sup> Report of the Independent Task Force on Emergency Responders sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, *Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared* (2003), p.4.

## **VI: CONCLUSION**

The NYPD has met the challenge of keeping crime down while carrying on a rigorous counter terrorism program by the addition of carefully tailored new tactics and the revamping of existing strategies. However, maintaining the present low crime rates and high levels of citizen satisfaction with personal safety and security cannot be taken for granted nor guaranteed for the future.

The strength and equipment of the NYPD must be maintained at a level sufficient to ensure public safety. Despite financial shortfalls, the city administration has authorized a complement of 37,000 officers and the use of overtime money to fill gaps. The wisdom of this decision was illustrated during the August 14<sup>th</sup> blackout.

However, municipal funds alone are not sufficient to ensure public safety. Because of its size and importance, the City finds itself a prime target in a war that has been declared against the entire United States. The unique vulnerability of New York must be recognized and an enhanced level of federal funding must be provided to the city.

**PART TWO**

**NEW YORK CITY**

**COMMUNITY SAFETY SURVEY 2003**

A report for the  
Citizens Crime Commission of New York City

by  
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## **A: The 2003 Survey—General**

This Community Safety Survey 2003 (CSS-2003) is the third in a series of three surveys commissioned by the Citizens Crime Commission of New York City. The first two were conducted in 1999<sup>7</sup> and 2001. Compared with other public opinion polls, this biennial tracking survey has three distinct goals: (1) develop a bilingual, psychometric-quality survey instrument with reliable and valid items that can also be combined into scale scores; (2) assess public attitudes on five issues: (a) neighborhood safety, (b) policing, (c) police-community relations, (d) quality of life enforcement, and (e) terrorism, while avoiding questions about individuals such as political figures or public officials; and, (3) use the survey items and scales to precisely chart New Yorkers' attitudes over time, ethnic group, and borough.

The CSS-2003 was notable in two respects: (1) it is the first CSS since the 9-11-01 attack on the World Trade Center, and thus incorporates questions about terrorism; and, (2) it is the first CSS conducted during a new City administration. Yet one thing is unchanged. The Crime Commission routinely expresses views on public issues involving crime and police. Therefore, in order to insulate the survey, the CCC maintained a hands-off policy, giving the researchers control of data collection, analysis, and interpretation of the findings. Section IIB reports the findings. Section IIC explains the survey methodology.

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<sup>7</sup> The 1999 survey was a pilot effort in which 203 respondents were interviewed. The 2001 survey included 834 respondents, while 750 New Yorkers responded in 2003.



## **B: Results and Discussion**

Neighborhood and City Safety (Qs 2-5). Respondents felt safe in their neighborhoods in 2003. Only 6% reported feeling unsafe during daylight hours and 17% at night. Only 18% reported their neighborhood has become less safe in the past 12 months whereas 20% felt it had become safer; 29% felt the City had become less safe in the previous 12 months; 21% thought it had become safer. (See discussion of neighborhood versus city perceptions below.) Combining these four items into a 4-20 "safety index," we see the 2003 score of 13.5 is nearly unchanged from 13.6 in 2001.

Problems (Q6). New Yorkers were presented with a checklist of eight neighborhood crime problems—drugs, guns, street gangs, abandoned buildings, assaults, muggings, thefts, burglaries. None of the problems was listed as serious by a majority of the respondents. On a scale of 0 (no) to 2 (yes), problems varied from 0.32 for abandoned buildings, up to 0.74 for drugs. Combining the 8 problems into a 0-16 problem index, we find the 2003 score of 4.4 unchanged from 2001.

Police (Qs 7, 8, 14 & 15). Neighborhood police also continue to elicit favorable responses, with 73% of respondents satisfied to very satisfied, a slightly higher percentage than the 68% in 2001. Also, 88% felt protection was the same or better than 12 months ago, similar to 90% in 2001.

When asked about plainclothes officers in high-crime areas, only 6% opposed this, compared to 9% opposed in 2001.

In the 2003 survey, respondents were less likely to cite police misconduct as a problem. In 2001, 59% of those interviewed said that police brutality was a serious problem whereas in the present survey the number dropped to 39.5%.

Quality-of-Life Enforcement (Qs 9-11). Over 50% of New Yorkers supported enforcement for each of the 10 quality-of-life (QOL) topics. But when scored on a scale of 0 (no) to 2 (yes), support for increased enforcement against these activities varied widely among these 10, from .91 for street vendors up to 1.46 for speeders. As in previous surveys, support for enforcement against jaywalking or street vendors was far lower than for enforcement against unsafe driving or annoyances such as littering and graffiti. Combining the 10 items into a 0-20 point QOL index, we find the score in 2003 is 11.95 with a wide variability (s.d.= 5.1), down from 15.01 in 2001 (s.d.= 3.5) and 14.60 in 1999 (s.d.= 3.0). A possible explanation for this finding is that until fairly recently, there was widespread street disorder in New York City, prompting strong public demands for vigorous quality-of-life enforcement. Since disorder has decreased, demand for enforcement has lessened. Indeed, despite some fears that after 2001 quality-of-life enforcement would be curtailed in New York City, our survey found that 6% of New Yorkers reported receiving a QOL summons in 2003, compared to less than 5% in 2001. (See Q 11, Table 2)

Terrorism (Qs 12 & 13). In this post-9/11 era of terrorist threats, New Yorkers were asked to distinguish how well the NYPD protects their "security" from terrorists as well as their "safety" from criminals. On a scale of 0-9, respondents rated the NYPD highly on all three questions: 6.72 for trying hard, 6.41 on effective security from terrorists, and 6.37 on safety

from criminals. Fifty-nine percent of respondents strongly supported police searches and other security measures; 30% expressed moderate support for them; and 10% disapproved.

Citywide versus Neighborhood Problems (Q16). When asked to apply a 0-9 scale to a list of 7 common urban problems, respondents' rankings ranged from 5.6 for transportation up to 7.9 for cost of living. Two findings are notable: (1) at 6.4, crime is only a middling problem on this list of 7, below 7.5 for unemployment and 6.5 for education; (2) these uniformly high ratings for citywide problems contrast with the lower ratings above for neighborhood problems. This is likely an artifact of what urbanologist Claude Fischer terms "urban malaise," that is, urbanites are accustomed to a general negativism towards city life unless the survey items are behaviorally anchored (as the neighborhood items are). As noted, when asked about a specific problem, crime fighting at the neighborhood level, most respondents thought it was being well handled. In addition, on our follow-up question (Q. 17) of why they live in New York City, a minority of 31% say they must (due to job or family), versus a 60% majority who want to live in the City by choice. Therefore, high ratings of city problems must be measured against general satisfaction with New York Life.

**Ethnicity.** How much do New Yorkers' views vary by their ethnicity? These findings are presented in Table 3, comparing 216 Hispanics, 194 non-Hispanic Blacks, 243 non-Hispanic whites, and 38 Asian New Yorkers. Data on respondents—see Table 2 and discussion pages 9 and 10.

In rating their neighborhood safety on a 1-5 scale, New Yorkers in 2003 uniformly rated daytime safety about 4.0 across ethnic groups, and nighttime safety about 3.5—identical to the 2001 findings. There were no ethnic divisions on neighborhood or City-wide changes in the past 12 months. On the 4-item scale of 4-20 points, all four ethnic groups were within one point of the mean of 13.5. The same is true in their rating of a list of 8 neighborhood problems. On a scale of no (0) to yes (2), no group rose above 1.0 on any problem, and on a 0-16 point scale, all groups were within one point of 4.4. In their satisfaction with police, all groups scored near the 1-5 mean of 2.9, and reported the same rate of change the past 12 months.

Use of plainclothes officers in high-crime areas was clearly favored by all four ethnic groups, averaging 4.3 on the 1-5 scale. On the question of whether brutality is a serious problem in the NYPD, using the 1-5 scale this was rated slightly but significantly lower by Asians (2.8) and whites (2.9) than Hispanics (3.2) and Blacks (3.5). Interestingly, the results also indicate a decrease in concern about police brutality in 2003 versus 2001 among Hispanics and Blacks.

In their view of 7 citywide problems (Q16), ethnic groups showed no systematic variations at all.

There was a clear and consistent moderation of support for QOL across all 4 ethnic groups, from a high 15.0 in 2001 to a moderate 12.0 in 2003.

**Geography.** Do views vary by boroughs in New York City? Table 5 reports the findings broken down by four boroughs, with no systematic trends apparent in this detailed data. If we focus specifically on QOL enforcement we see the same pattern in 2003 as in 2001, that Manhattanites are slightly but consistently less supportive of 9 of the 10 measures than those in the other 3 boroughs.

**Intercorrelations.** To what extent do New Yorkers' attitudes across the several topics correlate with one another: (a) Neighborhood safety / problems / police, (b) QOL enforcement, (c) Police-community relations, (d) post-9-11 terrorism, (e) City-wide problems, and their own biodata? Such correlations can reveal more subtle dynamics underlying public opinions today. A few general trends warrant our attention here.

1. Consistency of attitudes. Our three multi-item checklists -- 8 items on neighborhood problems, 10 items on QOL, and 7 items on urban problems -- all proved to have what psychometricians term "internal reliability," indicating that one has a relatively consistent view across that topic. When we measured this with Cronbach's alpha, varying from 0 to 1, we find all three scales have an alpha well above .50: neighborhood problems ( $\alpha = .77$ ), QOL ( $\alpha = .79$ ), and urban problems ( $\alpha = .69$ ).

2. Biodata. When we look at citizens' biodata-- age, gender, years in their neighborhood, involvement, QOL summonses-- it is striking how little these demographics correlate with their attitudes. For example, on a 0 to 1 scale, one's years living in their neighborhood correlates virtually zero with their scores on neighborhood problems ( $r = -.02$ ), QOL ( $r = .07$ ), urban problems ( $r = -.05$ ), liking for City life ( $r = .06$ ), safety in daytime ( $r = .00$ ) or nighttime ( $r = .01$ ), satisfaction with police ( $r = -.01$ ), or security from terrorism ( $r = .04$ ). Though New Yorkers certainly vary widely in their attitudes toward community safety, this seems squarely based on life experience and not demographic categories.

3. Attitudes. In contrast, several attitudes are connected with one another in revealing ways. For example, one's choosing to (rather than having to) live in the City is significantly correlated with their preference for QOL enforcement ( $r = +.12$ ,  $p < .01$ ), feeling safe during

the day ( $r = +.11$ ) and night ( $r = +.16$ ), satisfaction with police ( $r = +.14$ ), and NYPD protection from criminals ( $r = +.14$ ). Another revealing example about terrorism, people's feeling of greater security from terrorists, is significantly related with preference for QOL enforcement ( $r = +.17$ ), satisfaction with police ( $r = +.23$ ), improved police performance the past 12 months ( $r = +.15$ ), NYPD efforts ( $r = +.55$ ), safety from criminals ( $r = +.54$ ), acceptance of anti-terror searches ( $r = +.23$ ), preference for plainclothes police in high-crime areas ( $r = +.15$ ), and lower ratings of NYPD brutality ( $r = -.14$ ). On the other hand, the three internally consistent scales only partially correlated with each other: ratings of neighborhood problems significantly correlated with urban problems ( $r = +.13$ ), but not QOL enforcement ( $r = .06$ ), and urban problems did not correlate with QOL ( $r = +.02$ ). Overall, it is fair to say that New Yorkers in 2003 are generally satisfied with community safety, QOL enforcement, and security from terrorism -- and this is a significant component in their satisfaction with City life in general.

## **C: Method**

CSS-2003 was an anonymous 25-item survey, covering the five key areas: (a) Neighborhood safety / problems / police (7 items); (b) QOL enforcement (2 items); (c) Police-community relations (2 items); (d) post-9-11 terrorism (2 items); (e) Citywide problems (2 items); plus 10 biodata items. (See Appendix.) It was largely based on CSS-1999 and CSS-2001, and included a Spanish version as well. The 25 items were not independent "one-item scales" common in public opinion polling, but were designed to be combined into larger,

scorable attitude scales (on QOL, neighborhood and City-wide problems, safety, police) which could analyze and track public opinion. These multi-item scales could be assessed for their psychometric qualities—internal homogeneity ( $\alpha$ ), and stability over time. Not least of all, the items were based in part on issues and verbatim comments that arose during a half-dozen focus group sessions with minority/nonminority and professional/nonprofessional New Yorkers.

**Procedure.** Random Digit Dialing (RDD) phone numbers were used to contact a representative sample of 150+ New York households in each of the four boroughs (excluding Richmond), using the phone banks at Fordham University and Pace University. A team of 27 trained researchers phoned each number in turn, and invited all respondents, age 18+, to voice their opinions in an anonymous 10-minute interview. Numbers were dialed in replicates of 40, with a number retired only after 5 unsuccessful attempts or some other disqualifier (fax, nonworking, nonresidential, refusal). Nonresponse rates in this survey continued to increase from past years, and an average of 20 numbers had to be dialed to obtain one completed survey, though once a respondent answered, the completion rate was a more acceptable 30 percent. A total of 750 (670 telephone and 80 field) interviews were completed during October, 2003, with households contacted at diverse hours—weekdays, weekend, mornings, afternoons, evenings—so as not to exclude any group.

**Participants.** The participants proved to be a representative cross-section of New Yorkers, diverse in age, ethnicity, and other features. A demographic analysis of the 750 respondents yields this biodata profile: Their ages varied from 18 to 70+, with a mean of 39.7 years. Their family lived in their current neighborhood from a few weeks up to 99 years, with a

mean of 17.4 years. Ethnically, the 750 included 216 Hispanics (29%), 194 non-Hispanic Blacks (26%), 243 non-Hispanic whites (32%), 38 Asians (5%) and 59 nonspecified or "other" ethnicities. Some 59.6% of respondents were females. Some 22% report living in a minority area, 62% in a mixed area, and 17% in a nonminority area. Almost half (47%) reported involvement in their neighborhood -- school, precinct council, church or some community group. Of 750 respondents, 44 opted for the Spanish CSS. About one in 16 respondents (6.1%) had received a QOL summons, up significantly from one in 22 (or 4.6%) in 2001.



### ***About the Research Team***

The Community Safety Survey 2003 was conducted by the Fordham Institute, a research arm of Fordham University. The Survey Director was **Harold Takooshian, PhD**, the Director of the Institute and a psychologist on the Fordham faculty since 1975. The Field Director was **George D. Stokes**, a Project Director with the Fordham Institute. With gratitude, the Institute thanks several people for their kind cooperation in this research. At Fordham University, **Linda Giamone, Danielle Armas, John Blythe, Shant Stepanian, Lee Badger, PhD**. At Pace University, **Richard S. Velayo, PhD, Janice Jackson, PhD, Victor Panaligan**. At Washington Irving High School, **Jennifer Smith**. At Hofstra University, **Vincent R. Brown, PhD**. Not least of all, our thanks to the motivated bilingual team of 30 researchers who worked through weekends and a holiday to complete this research with such celerity and care:

<b>Celia Alvarez</b>	<b>Dayquiria Arias</b>	<b>Elizabeth Brown-Jordan, PhD</b>
<b>Justin S. Benagh</b>	<b>Graviela Carvajal</b>	<b>Marlon Chung</b>
<b>Ivette DelaCruz</b>	<b>Jefferson DeLaRosa</b>	<b>Christine Fernandez</b>
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<b>Sumair Khan</b>	<b>Rashida King</b>	<b>Adriani Leon</b>
<b>Chrissy Mitakakis</b>	<b>Jose Morales</b>	<b>Nestor Orellani</b>
<b>Jose Perez</b>	<b>Marta Polaniec</b>	<b>Jasmin Powell</b>
<b>Melissa Rodriguez</b>	<b>Blair Shand</b>	<b>Janet T. Schultz, MS</b>
<b>Shatema Small</b>	<b>Ken Tatis</b>	<b>Julissa Torres</b>
<b>Rosa Vila</b>	<b>Yu Ping Wu</b>	<b>William Michael Verdi, PhD</b>

**Research note:** With a city-wide stratified random sample of 750, and a normal distribution on a 1-5 scale, the statistical power of the test around the midpoint of the scale is calculated at 0.1. So a difference of greater than 0.1 on the 1-5 scale is significant. The power based on 150 responses per borough is closer to 0.2. As far as percentages are concerned, with a sample of 750 the standard error is  $\pm 3.5\%$  with a confidence level of 95% and a normal distribution.

**Table 1. Responses of 750 New Yorkers in 2003**  
(and 2001 in lightface, 1999 in italics )

	Percentage agreement					Mean (s.d.)
	1	2	3	4	5	2003/2001 / 1999
<b>A. NEIGHBORHOOD SAFETY,</b>						
<b>PROBLEMS, POLICE? (1=low to 5=high)</b>						
1. Number of years in current neighborhood? (see Table 2)						
2. In your neighborhood today, how safe do you feel on the streets during daylight?	2.4	3.9	14.2	49.9	29.6	4.01 (0.9)
	3	6	13	44	35	4.0 (1.0)
						4.1 (1.0)
3. during nighttime?	4.6	11.8	24.3	43.5	15.7	3.54 (1.0)
	9	14	22	39	17	3.4 (1.1)
						3.5 (1.1)
4. Compared with 12 months ago, would you say your neighborhood today is [less/more safe]?	2.7	15.3	62.1	12.9	7.0	3.06 (0.8)
	3	14	65	12	7	3.0 (1.0)
						3.2 (1.0)
5. New York City streets in general are [less/more safe]?	4.6	24.3	50.4	13.8	6.9	2.94 (0.9)
	5	13	49	22	11	3.2 (1.1)
						3.3 (1.1)
<b>TOTAL safety [4-20] mean:</b>						<b>13.54 (3.5)</b>
						13.6 (3.6)
						14.1 (3.5)
6. In the past 12 months, which would you say has been a serious problem on or around your block? [0= No, 1= Maybe, 2= Yes]						
a. Drugs	56.6	13.2	30.2			.74 (0.9)
	57	10	34			.77
b. Guns	69.9	12.4	17.7			.48 (0.8)
	69	8	22			.53
c. Street gangs	66.9	12.7	20.4			.53 (0.8)
	72	9	19			.47
d. Abandoned buildings	81.3	5.8	12.9			.32 (0.7)
	84	4	12			.27
e. Assaults on the street	66.4	13.5	20.1			.54 (0.8)
	73	9	17			.44
f. Muggings	65.2	13.9	20.8			.56 (0.8)
	69	10	21			.52
g. Theft of property	61.2	14.2	24.6			.63 (0.8)
	59	10	31			.72
h. Burglary of homes/businesses	65.7	12.0	22.3			.56 (0.8)
	60	10	30			.70
<b>TOTAL problems [0-16] mean:</b>						<b>4.36 (4.1)</b>
						4.4 (4.1)
7. In general, how satisfied are you with the police who serve your neighborhood? [1= not at all, 5=extremely]	6.6	20.5	46.6	21.0	5.3	2.98 (0.9)
	12	20	38	22	7	2.9 (0.8)
8. In the past 12 months, has police protection in your neighborhood become [1= much worse, 5= much better]	2.4	10.0	63.2	18.3	6.2	3.16 (0.8)
	2	8	59	23	8	3.3 (0.9)
						3.2 (0.9)

**Table 1. Responses of 750 New Yorkers in 2003 (continued)**  
(and 2001 in lightface, 1999 in italics)

	Percentage agreement					Mean (s.d.)	
	1	2	3	4	5	2003/2001 / 1999	
<b>B. QUALITY OF LIFE ENFORCEMENT?</b>							
9. In recent years, NYPD police have increased enforcement of Quality-of-Life, to improve things that bother most New Yorkers. For each of these, tell me if you disagree, have no opinion, or agree with police enforcement of it?							
a. jaywalking		42.1	23.4	34.6		.92	(0.9)
b. littering		28.9	12.0	59.1		1.30	(0.9)
c. street vendors		42.7	23.2	34.0		.91	(0.9)
d. pot-smoking		31.3	18.1	50.5		1.19	(0.9)
e. squeegees		33.6	26.2	40.2		1.06	(0.9)
f. speeding		23.1	7.6	69.3		1.46	(0.9)
g. loitering		28.8	16.0	55.2		1.26	(0.9)
h. loud radios		30.4	15.0	54.6		1.24	(0.9)
i. bad taxi driving		26.4	16.5	57.1		1.30	(0.9)
j. graffiti		27.7	14.6	57.6		1.30	(0.9)
<b>TOTAL [0 - 20] mean:</b>						<b>11.95</b>	<b>(5.10)</b>
						15.01	(3.48)
						<i>14.60</i>	<i>(3.0)</i>
10. Overall, do you approve of the City's Quality-of-life enforcement? [1=not at all, 5=definitely]	8.4	15.8	22.9	26.8	26.3	3.45	(1.3)
	7	15	12	27	39	3.8	(1.3)
						3.8	<i>(1.3)</i>
11. Have you received a QOL summons? (see Table 2)							
<b>C. TERRORISM POST- 9/11? (0 = low, 9 = high)</b>							
12. Since the terrorist attacks on 9/11, police are expected to protect both our "security" from terrorists as well as our "safety" from criminals. On a 0-9 scale, how HARD do you feel NYPD police have been trying in order to make us secure from terrorists?							
a. Trying hard:						6.72	(2.1)
How EFFECTIVE today in making you							
a. secure from terrorists:						6.41	(2.3)
c. safe from criminals:						6.37	(2.3)
13. Do you generally support the personal searches and other increased security measures in our City's public areas intended to stop terrorists? [1=not at all, 5=extremely]	10.3	7.3	23.1	38.7	20.5	3.52	(1.2)

**Table 1. Responses of 750 New Yorkers in 2003 (continued)**  
(and 2001 in lightface, 1999 in italics)

	Percentage agreement					Mean (s.d.)	
	1	2	3	4	5	2003 / 2001	
<b>D. POLICE IN MINORITY COMMUNITIES?</b>							
14. To get more drugs and guns off the street, or protect taxi drivers, some cities like New York have put more plainclothes police in high-crime areas. Would you say such undercover policing is a good idea? [1= No, 5= Yes]	2.1	3.9	13.9	18.9	61.2	4.33	(1.0)
	5	4	10	17	65	4.3	(1.1)
15. How serious a problem do you think police brutality is in New York City? [1= Not at all, 5= very serious]	8.5	19.1	32.8	24.9	14.6	3.18	(1.2)
	6	11	23	29	30	3.7	(1.2)
<b>E. URBAN PROBLEMS (0= low, 9= High)</b>							
16. Here is a list of 7 common urban problems. Please rate each one on how much you think this is a problem in New York City today, from 0 (not at all) to 9 (very much).							
a. Unemployment						7.47	(2.0)
b. Cost of living						7.85	(1.8)
c. Transportation						6.25	(2.4)
d. Race relations						5.61	(2.5)
e. Education						6.53	(2.4)
f. Crime						6.42	(2.2)
g. Terrorism						5.97	(2.7)
17. Would you say you live in New York City today more because you "have to" (due to job, family, etc.) or because you "Like to"? (1=Have to, 2=?, 3=Like to)	30.5	9.2	60.4			2.30	(0.9)

**Table 2. Respondents' biodata in 2003, broken down by ethnicity**  
(and 834 New Yorkers in 2001 in lightface type)

	216 <u>Hispanics</u>	194 <u>Blacks</u>	243 <u>Whites</u>	38 <u>Asians</u>	p =	<b>750</b> <b>Total (s.d.)</b>
1. How many years has your family lived in its current neighborhood?	<b>16.0</b> 12.3	<b>16.6</b> 14.3	<b>20.6</b> 19.3	<b>10.1</b> 8.1	*.001 *.001	<b>17.4 (14.8)</b> 16.8 (14.9)
11. Have you received a quality-of-life summons?	<b>5.3%</b> 6.2%	<b>7.6%</b> 3.7%	<b>4.3%</b> 4.2%	<b>8.8%</b> 4.4%	.42 .66	<b>6.1%</b> 4.6%
18. Are you involved with your neighborhood: church, school board, precinct council, community group(s)?	<b>53.7%</b> 53.%	<b>59.1%</b> 67.%	<b>45.4%</b> 39.%	<b>47.1%</b> * 6.%	*.02 *.02	<b>47.3%</b> 44.0%
19. Your age? [mean, in years]	<b>35.8</b> 31.9	<b>38.7</b> 36.3	<b>44.0</b> 43.6	<b>35.0</b> 28.7	*.001 *.001	<b>39.7 (17.4)</b> 37.0 (16.8)
20. Is your current neighborhood black/Hispanic? No:	<b>7.1%</b> 12.4%	<b>6.8%</b> 3.2%	<b>33.0%</b> 30.8%	<b>15.2%</b> 13.0%	*.001 *.001	<b>16.6%</b> 16.9%
Mixed:	<b>63.7%</b> 54.5	<b>63.4%</b> 58.1	<b>58.0%</b> 62.2	<b>72.7%</b> 63.0		<b>61.8%</b> 59.3
Yes:	<b>27.5%</b> 33.2	<b>29.8%</b> 38.7	<b>9.0%</b> 7.0	<b>12.1%</b> 23.9		<b>21.7%</b> 23.8
22. Gender? [percent female]	<b>57.9%</b> 62.7%	<b>72.1%</b> 67.0%	<b>53.0%</b> 56.0%	<b>43.8%</b> 52.1%	*.001 .07	<b>59.6%</b> 60.8%

**Table 3. New Yorkers' responses in 2003, by ethnicity**  
(2001 in lightface, 1999 in italics)

	216	194	243	38		<u>Total (s.d.)</u>	
	<u>Hispan</u>	<u>Blacks</u>	<u>Whites</u>	<u>Asians</u>	<u>p =</u>	<u>2003 / 2001 / 1999</u>	
<b>A. NEIGHBORHOOD SAFETY, PROBLEMS, POLICE? (1=low to 5=high)</b>							
2. In your neighborhood, how safe do you feel on the streets during daylight?	<b>3.80</b>	<b>3.90</b>	<b>4.24</b>	<b>4.00</b>	*.001	<b>4.00</b>	(0.93)
	3.9	3.9	4.3	4.0	*.001	4.00	(0.9)
						3.9	
3. during nighttime?	<b>3.31</b>	<b>3.51</b>	<b>3.75</b>	<b>3.63</b>	*.001	<b>3.52</b>	(1.00)
	3.3	3.5	3.8	3.7	*.01	3.50	(1.0)
						3.5	
4. Compared with 12 months ago, would you say your neighborhood today is [less/more safe]?	<b>3.06</b>	<b>3.10</b>	<b>3.03</b>	<b>2.95</b>	.81	<b>3.06</b>	(0.81)
	3.1	3.1	3.0	2.9	.70	3.10	(0.8)
						3.2	
5. New York City streets in general are [less/more safe]?	<b>3.01</b>	<b>2.90</b>	<b>2.87</b>	<b>3.13</b>	.50	<b>2.90</b>	(0.9)
	3.1	2.9	2.9	3.2	.50	2.90	(0.9)
						3.3	
<b>TOTAL safety [4-20]</b>	<b>13.2</b>	<b>13.5</b>	<b>14.2</b>	<b>13.7</b>	.06	<b>13.48</b>	(3.0)
	13.3	13.4	14.3	13.5	.06	13.6	(3.0)
						14.1	
6. In the past 12 months, which would you say has been a serious problem on or around your block? (0= No, 1= maybe, 2= Yes)							
a. Drugs	<b>.97</b>	<b>.89</b>	<b>.53</b>	<b>.39</b>	*.001	<b>.76</b>	(.90)
	.9	.9	.5	.4	*.001	.74	(.77)
b. Guns	<b>.68</b>	<b>.63</b>	<b>.27</b>	<b>.37</b>	*.001	<b>.50</b>	(.79)
	.7	.6	.3	.3	*.001	.48	(.53)
c. Street gangs	<b>.64</b>	<b>.54</b>	<b>.43</b>	<b>.49</b>	.12	<b>.53</b>	(.81)
	.6	.6	.4	.5	*.001	.53	(.47)
d. Abandoned buildings	<b>.33</b>	<b>.32</b>	<b>.30</b>	<b>.19</b>	.16	<b>.32</b>	(.69)
	.3	.4	.3	.2	*.001	.32	(.27)
e. Assaults on the street	<b>.72</b>	<b>.50</b>	<b>.45</b>	<b>.62</b>	*.01	<b>.56</b>	(.82)
	.7	.5	.4	.6	.10	.54	(.44)
f. Muggings	<b>.68</b>	<b>.51</b>	<b>.54</b>	<b>.73</b>	.16	<b>.58</b>	(.82)
	.5	.5	.5	.7	.06	.56	(.52)
g. Theft of property	<b>.59</b>	<b>.60</b>	<b>.67</b>	<b>.57</b>	.54	<b>.63</b>	(.85)
	.6	.6	.7	.6	.08	.63	(.72)
h. Burglary of homes/businesses	<b>.57</b>	<b>.52</b>	<b>.56</b>	<b>.76</b>	.37	<b>.57</b>	(.83)
	.5	.5	.6	.8	.06	.56	(.70)
<b>TOTAL problems [0-16]</b>	<b>5.13</b>	<b>4.47</b>	<b>3.77</b>	<b>4.14</b>	*.01	<b>4.44</b>	(4.10)
	5.3	5.3	3.4	4.2	*.001	4.4	(4.1)
7. In general, how satisfied are you with the police who serve your neighborhood? [1= not at all, 5=extremely]	<b>2.93</b>	<b>2.76</b>	<b>3.09</b>	<b>2.97</b>	*.02	<b>2.94</b>	(1.00)
	3.02	2.78	3.10	3.03	*.001	2.98	(0.9)
						3.2	(1.1)
8. In the past 12 months, has police protection in your neighborhood become [1= much worse, 5= much better]	<b>3.18</b>	<b>3.21</b>	<b>3.04</b>	<b>3.16</b>	.16	<b>3.14</b>	(0.80)
	3.24	3.21	3.05	3.12	*.04	3.16	(0.8)
						3.2	(1.1)

**Table 3. 750 New Yorkers' responses in 2003, by ethnicity (continued)**  
(2001 in lightface, 1999 in italics)

	216 Hispan	194 Blacks	243 Whites	38 Asians	<u>Total (s.d.)</u>	<u>p=</u>
					<b>2003 / 2001 / 1999</b>	
9. 10. Quality-of-life enforcement? (See Table 4.)						
<b>C. TERRORISM POST- 9/11? (0 = low, 9 = high)</b>						
12. Since the terrorist attacks on 9/11, police are expected to protect both our "security" from terrorists as well as our "safety" from criminals. On a 0-9 scale, how HARD do you feel NYPD police have been trying in order to make us secure from terrorists?						
a. Trying hard:	6.73	6.34	6.62	6.97	<b>6.63</b> (2.2)	.24
How EFFECTIVE today in making you						
a. secure from terrorists:	<b>6.47</b>	<b>6.14</b>	<b>6.15</b>	<b>5.97</b>	<b>6.26</b> (2.5)	.49
c. safe from criminals:	<b>6.24</b>	<b>5.99</b>	<b>6.47</b>	<b>6.71</b>	<b>6.27</b> (2.3)	.21
13. Do you generally support the personal searches and other increased security measures in our City's public areas intended to stop terrorists? [1=not at all, 5=extremely]	<b>3.40</b>	<b>3.39</b>	<b>3.62</b>	<b>3.29</b>	<b>3.46</b> (1.2)	.20
<b>D. POLICE IN MINORITY COMMUNITIES?</b>						
14. To get more drugs and guns off the street, or protect taxi drivers, some cities like New York have put more plainclothes police in high-crime areas. Would you say such undercover policing is a good idea? [1= No, 5= Yes]	<b>4.36</b>	<b>4.18</b>	<b>4.51</b>	<b>3.94</b>	<b>4.33</b> (1.0)	*.001
	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.3 (1.1)	*.02
15. How serious a problem do you think police brutality is in New York City? [1= Not at all, 5= very serious]	<b>3.21</b>	<b>3.53</b>	<b>2.89</b>	<b>2.76</b>	<b>3.18</b> (1.2)	*.001
	3.9	4.2	3.1	3.3	3.7 (1.2)	*.001
<b>E. URBAN PROBLEMS? (0= low, 9= High)</b>						
16. Here is a list of 7 common urban problems. Please rate each one on how much you think this is a problem in New York City today, from 0 (not at all) to 9 (very much).						
a. Unemployment	<b>7.67</b>	<b>7.74</b>	<b>7.24</b>	<b>6.58</b>	<b>7.47</b> (2.0)	*.002
b. Cost of living	<b>8.01</b>	<b>7.93</b>	<b>7.85</b>	<b>7.34</b>	<b>7.85</b> (1.8)	.26
c. Transportation	<b>6.49</b>	<b>6.32</b>	<b>5.88</b>	<b>5.95</b>	<b>6.25</b> (2.4)	.07
d. Race relations	<b>5.60</b>	<b>6.01</b>	<b>5.51</b>	<b>5.58</b>	<b>5.61</b> (2.5)	.29
e. Education	<b>6.78</b>	<b>6.52</b>	<b>6.48</b>	<b>6.00</b>	<b>6.53</b> (2.4)	.17
f. Crime	<b>6.68</b>	<b>6.63</b>	<b>6.22</b>	<b>5.76</b>	<b>6.42</b> (2.2)	*.04
g. Terrorism	<b>6.19</b>	<b>5.86</b>	<b>5.98</b>	<b>5.68</b>	<b>5.97</b> (2.7)	.70
<b>TOTAL urban problems [0-63]:</b>	<b>47.5</b>	<b>47.1</b>	<b>45.2</b>	<b>42.9</b>	<b>46.35</b> (9.5)	*.01
17. Would you say you live in New York City today more because you "have to" (due to job, family, etc.) or because you "Like to"? (1=Have to, 2=?, 3=Like to)	<b>2.18</b>	<b>2.24</b>	<b>2.41</b>	<b>2.34</b>	<b>2.29</b> (.90)	.06

**Table 4. Mean scores on quality of life enforcement, by ethnicity and by year  
(2003 in bold, 2001 in plain, 1999 in italics)**

**B. QUALITY OF LIFE ENFORCEMENT?**

9. In recent years, NYPD police have increased enforcement of Quality-of-Life, to improve things that bother most New Yorker  
For each of these, tell me if you disagree [=0], have no opinion [=1], or agree [=2] with police enforcement of it?

	216	194	243	38	750	
	<u>Hispanics</u>	<u>Blacks</u>	<u>Whites</u>	<u>Asians</u>	<u>Total (s.d.)</u>	<u>p =</u>
a. jaywalking	<b>0.9</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>0.92</b> (.87)	<b>.52</b>
	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.2	0.93 (.92)	.08
	.8	.9	.6	-	.8	.13
b. littering	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>1.30</b> (.89)	<b>.60</b>
	1.2	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.69 (.68)	.54
	<i>1.7</i>	<i>1.9</i>	<i>1.7</i>	-	<i>1.8</i>	<i>.19</i>
c. street vendors	.9	.9	.9	* <b>1.2</b>	<b>.91</b> (.87)	<b>.12</b>
	.6	.6	.5	* .9	.60 (.86)	.18
	<i>1.0</i>	<i>.8</i>	<i>.6</i>	-	<i>.80</i>	<i>*.03</i>
d. pot-smoking	<b>1.2</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>1.19</b> (.89)	<b>.41</b>
	1.7	1.7	* 1.5	1.7	1.64 (.70)	* .02
	<i>1.6</i>	<i>1.6</i>	<i>1.4</i>	-	<i>1.6</i>	<i>.19</i>
e. squeegees	<b>1.0</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>1.06</b> (.86)	<b>.12</b>
	1.3	1.2	1.5	1.6	1.36 (.87)	* .02
	<i>1.2</i>	<i>1.2</i>	<i>1.4</i>	-	<i>1.3</i>	<i>.52</i>
f. speeding	<b>1.4</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>1.46</b> (.85)	<b>.38</b>
	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.90 (.41)	.54
	<i>1.8</i>	<i>1.9</i>	<i>1.8</i>	-	<i>1.8</i>	<i>.17</i>
g. loitering	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>1.26</b> (.88)	<b>.88</b>
	1.6	* 1.8	1.5	1.5	1.61 (.73)	* .001
	<i>1.5</i>	<i>1.4</i>	<i>1.3</i>	-	<i>1.4</i>	<i>.23</i>
h. loud radios	<b>1.1</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.24</b> (.89)	<b>.36</b>
	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.65 (.71)	.25
	<i>1.5</i>	<i>1.6</i>	<i>1.8</i>	-	<i>1.6</i>	<i>.09</i>
i. bad taxi driving	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>1.30</b> (.86)	<b>.79</b>
	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.83 (.69)	.50
	<i>1.7</i>	<i>1.8</i>	<i>1.9</i>	-	<i>1.8</i>	<i>.30</i>
j. graffiti	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>1.30</b> (.89)	<b>.99</b>
	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.81 (.54)	.35
	<i>1.7</i>	<i>1.8</i>	<i>1.8</i>	-	<i>1.8</i>	<i>.30</i>
TOTAL [0 - 20]	<b>11.73</b>	<b>11.92</b>	<b>12.14</b>	<b>11.47</b>	<b>11.95</b> (5.12)	<b>.86</b>
	15.2	15.3	14.6	15.5	15.01 (3.48)	.09
	<i>14.5</i>	<i>14.9</i>	<i>14.2</i>	--	<i>14.6</i>	<i>.42</i>

Note: \* Significant difference,  $p < .05$

10. Overall, do you approve of the City's Quality-of-life enforcement? [1=not at all, 5=definitely]

<b>3.48</b>	<b>3.38</b>	<b>3.54</b>	<b>3.26</b>	<b>3.45</b> (1.3)	<b>.37</b>
3.9	3.5	3.9	3.8	3.8 (1.3)	* .01
				<i>3.8</i> ( <i>1.3</i> )	<i>*.01</i>



**Table 5. Responses of 750 New Yorkers in 2003, by 4 boroughs**  
(compared with 2001 in lightface)

	Percentage agreement					Mean (s.d.)	p=
	1	2	3	4	5		
<b>A. NEIGHBORHOOD SAFETY, PROBLEMS, POLICE? (1=low to 5=high)</b>							
2. In your neighborhood, how safe do you feel on the streets during daylight?	Bkl: <b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>4.01</b>	(.9) * .001
	1	8	16	49	25	3.9	(.9)
	Brx: <b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>21</b>		
	5	7	15	41	33	3.9	(1.1)
	Man: <b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>40</b>		
	3	2	8	35	51	4.3	(.9)
	Qns: <b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>31</b>		
	3	5	11	50	31	4.0	(.9)
3. during nighttime?	Bkl: <b>2</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>3.54</b>	(1.0) * .001
	11	18	24	37	10	3.2	(1.2)
	Brx: <b>8</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>9</b>		
	14	18	22	28	19	3.2	(1.3)
	Man: <b>5</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>20</b>		
	5	9	15	46	26	3.8	(1.1)
	Qns: <b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>21</b>		
	6	10	24	46	14	3.5	(1.1)
4. Compared with 12 months ago, would you say your neighborhood today is [less/more safe]?	Bkl: <b>3</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3.06</b>	(.8) * .001
	4	10	65	10	10	3.1	(.9)
	Brx: <b>3</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>4</b>		
	5	19	51	18	7	3.0	(.9)
	Man: <b>2</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>10</b>		
	0	8	81	8	3	3.1	(.5)
	Qns: <b>3</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>7</b>		
	1	18	65	10	5	3.0	(.7)
5. New York City streets in general are [less/more safe]?	Bkl: <b>5</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2.94</b>	(.9) .43
	4	13	47	22	14	3.3	(1.0)
	Brx: <b>7</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>7</b>		
	7	14	42	24	12	3.2	(1.1)
	Man: <b>2</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>8</b>		
	3	7	63	20	7	3.2	(.8)
	Qns: <b>5</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>8</b>		
	3	8	45	23	10	3.2	(1.0)
6. Neighborhood problems? (See Appendix)							
7. In general, how satisfied are you with the police who serve your neighborhood? [1= not at all, 5=extremely]	Bkl: <b>8</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2.98</b>	(.9) * .03
	14	30	33	17	6	2.7	(1.0)
	Brx: <b>8</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>4</b>		
	17	20	38	16	9	2.8	(1.2)
	Man: <b>7</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>8</b>		
	8	15	38	30	9	3.2	(1.1)
	Qns: <b>5</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>6</b>		
	8	17	43	26	5	3.0	(1.0)

**Table 5. Responses of 750 New Yorkers in 2003, by 4 boroughs (continued)**  
(compared with 2001 in lightface)

	Percentage agreement					Mean (s.d.)	p=
	1	2	3	4	5		
8. In the past 12 months, has police protection in your neighborhood become [1= much worse, 5= much better]	Bkl: <b>2</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3.16</b> (.8)	.29
	2	8	60	22	8	3.3 (.8)	
	Brx: <b>4</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>8</b>		
	3	10	48	29	11	3.4 (.9)	
	Man: <b>2</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>8</b>		
	1	5	71	18	5	3.2 (.6)	
	Qns: <b>1</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>5</b>		
	1	8	60	23	7	3.3 (.8)	
9. Quality of life enforcement? (see below.)							
10. Overall, do you approve of the City's Quality-of-life enforcement? [1=not at all, 5=definitely]	Bkl: <b>13</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>3.45</b> (1.3)	.36
	5	20	12	23	41	3.8 (1.3)	
	Brx: <b>9</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>20</b>		
	6	16	14	24	40	3.8 (1.3)	
	Man: <b>7</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>29</b>		
	8	12	11	33	36	3.8 (1.3)	
	Qns: <b>6</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>30</b>		
	8	12	10	29	40	3.8 (1.3)	
11. QOL summons? (see Table 2.)							
12. 13. Post-terrorism views? (see below.)							
<b>D. POLICE IN MINORITY COMMUNITIES?</b>							
14. To get more drugs and guns off the street, or protect taxi drivers, some cities like New York have put more plainclothes police in high-crime areas. Would you say such undercover policing is a good idea? [1= No, 5= Yes]	Bkl: <b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>68</b>		.06
	6	4	8	12	70	4.4 (1.1)	
	Brx: <b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>64</b>		
	5	3	9	13	69	4.4 (1.1)	
	Man: <b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>55</b>		
	4	5	12	25	54	4.2 (1.1)	
	Qns: <b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>61</b>		
	5	3	9	18	65	4.3 (1.1)	
15. How serious a problem do you think police brutality is in New York City? [1= Not at all, 5= very serious]	Bkl: <b>6</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>17</b>		.26
	8	13	20	29	30	3.6 (1.3)	
	Brx: <b>5</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>18</b>		
	4	8	18	30	40	3.9 (1.1)	
	Man: <b>11</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>14</b>		
	8	8	26	28	31	3.6 (1.2)	
	Qns: <b>11</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>11</b>		
	7	15	27	31	21	3.4 (1.2)	

**Table 5. Responses from 750 New Yorkers in 2003, by 4 boroughs (continued)**  
(2001 in lightface)

	150	181	219	200	<u>Total (s.d.)</u>	<u>p=</u>
					<u>Queens</u>	<u>2003</u>
		<u>Bkln</u>	<u>Bronx</u>	<u>Manh</u>		
<b>C. TERRORISM POST- 9/11 (0 = low, 9 = high)</b>						
12. Since the terrorist attacks on 9/11, police are expected to protect both our "security" from terrorists as well as our "safety" from criminals. On a 0-9 scale, how HARD do you feel NYPD police have been trying in order to make us secure from terrorists? a. Trying hard:						
How EFFECTIVE today in making you						
a. secure from terrorists:	6.61	6.73	6.46	6.79	6.72 (2.1)	.70
c. safe from criminals:	6.20	6.57	5.87	6.51	6.41 (2.3)	.07
	6.26	6.11	6.03	6.75	6.37 (2.3)	.08
13. Do you generally support the personal searches and other increased security measures in our City's public areas intended to stop terrorists? [1=not at all, 5=extremely]	3.43	3.60	3.31	3.53	3.46 (1.2)	.29
<b>E. URBAN PROBLEMS (0= low, 9= High)</b>						
16. Here is a list of 7 common urban problems. Please rate each one on how much you think this is a problem in New York City today, from 0 (not at all) to 9 (very much).						
a. Unemployment	7.53	7.63	7.40	7.53	7.47 (2.0)	.58
b. Cost of living	7.77	7.95	7.91	8.00	7.85 (1.8)	.87
c. Transportation	6.06	6.54	5.88	6.32	6.25 (2.4)	*.02
d. Race relations	5.36	5.67	5.75	5.87	5.61 (2.5)	.37
e. Education	6.22	6.69	6.78	6.58	6.53 (2.4)	.43
f. Crime	6.18	6.77	6.24	6.67	6.42 (2.2)	.57
g. Terrorism	5.89	6.07	5.71	6.39	5.97 (2.7)	.55
<b>TOTAL urban problems [0-63]:</b>	<b>44.9</b>	<b>47.3</b>	<b>45.8</b>	<b>47.4</b>	<b>46.35 (9.5)</b>	<b>.98</b>
17. Would you say you live in New York City today more because you "have to" (due to job, family, etc.) or because you "Like to"? (1=Have to, 2=?, 3=Like to)	2.24	2.13	2.36	2.35	2.29 (.90)	.06

**Table 5. Responses of 750 New Yorkers in 2003, by 4 boroughs (continued)**  
(compared with 2001 in lightface)

**B. QUALITY OF LIFE ENFORCEMENT?**

9. In recent years, NYPD police have increased enforcement of Quality-of-Life, to improve things that bother most New Yorkers. For each of these, tell me if you disagree [=0], have no opinion [=1], or agree [=2] with police enforcement of it?

	150 Brooklyn	181 Bronx	219 Manhattan	200 Queens	750 Total (s.d.)	p =
a. jaywalking	<b>.90</b> 0.9	<b>.94</b> 1.0	<b>.86</b> 0.8	<b>1.00</b> 1.0	<b>.93</b> (.87) 0.93 (.92)	.12 .31
b. littering	<b>1.34</b> 1.7	<b>1.30</b> 1.7	<b>1.22</b> 1.6	<b>1.37</b> 1.7	<b>1.30</b> (.89) 1.69 (.68)	.41 .24
c. street vendors	<b>.87</b> .6	<b>1.02</b> .7	<b>.84</b> .5	<b>.93</b> .7	<b>.91</b> (.87) .60 (.86)	*.04 .17
d. pot-smoking	<b>1.13</b> 1.7	<b>1.36</b> 1.7	<b>1.08</b> * 1.4	<b>1.21</b> 1.7	<b>1.19</b> (.89) 1.64 (.70)	*.02 *.001
e. squeegies	<b>1.05</b> 1.3	<b>1.08</b> 1.4	<b>1.11</b> 1.4	<b>1.02</b> 1.4	<b>1.07</b> (.86) 1.36 (.87)	.65 .99
f. speeding	<b>1.57</b> 1.9	<b>1.53</b> 1.9	<b>1.38</b> 1.9	<b>1.42</b> 1.9	<b>1.46</b> (.84) 1.90 (.41)	*.01 .30
g. loitering	<b>1.29</b> 1.7	<b>1.29</b> 1.7	<b>1.20</b> * 1.4	<b>1.29</b> 1.6	<b>1.26</b> (.88) 1.61 (.73)	.31 *.001
h. loud radios	<b>1.27</b> 1.7	<b>1.30</b> 1.7	<b>1.18</b> 1.5	<b>1.23</b> 1.7	<b>1.24</b> (.89) 1.65 (.71)	.93 .15
i. bad taxi driving	<b>1.36</b> 1.8	<b>1.29</b> 1.8	<b>1.30</b> 1.8	<b>1.29</b> 1.9	<b>1.31</b> (.86) 1.83 (.69)	.39 .93
j. graffiti	<b>1.36</b> 1.9	<b>1.32</b> 1.8	<b>1.25</b> * 1.7	<b>1.32</b> 1.9	<b>1.31</b> (.89) 1.81 (.54)	.54 *.01
TOTAL [0 - 20]	<b>12.17</b> 15.3	<b>12.43</b> 15.3	<b>11.47</b> * 14.0	<b>12.13</b> 15.4	<b>11.95</b> (5.12) 15.01 (3.48)	.75 *.001

Note: \* Significant difference,  $p < .05$ , two-tail test